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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to analyze the potential for synergies between climate 
policies and development in a case study on India focusing on the power sector sub-
optimalities. To do so, we use IMACLIM-R, a dynamic recursive energy-economy 
model that represents a second best world with market imperfections and short-run 
adjustments constraints along a long-term growth path. The analysis suggests (i) 
global carbon pricing induces prohibitive macroeconomic costs for the Indian 
economy, even in the case of significant financial transfers associated with a global 
cap-and-trade system and a “Contraction and Convergence in 2100” allocation 
scheme; (ii) the most cost efficient climate policies are not uniform carbon pricing 
only. The implementation of domestic policies suited to the national context, for 
instance targeting sub-optimalities in the power sector for India, allows reducing 
significantly the macroeconomic costs induced by international mitigation policies. 
 
Keywords 
India, second-best world, synergies between climate mitigation and development 
 Introduction 
 
There is now a global scientific consensus that stringent GHG emissions reductions 
are necessary to limit the high risks associated with anthropogenic climate change, and 
this consensus is flagged as a long run collective target by an increasing number of 
policymakers from all countries (G8 declaration in l’Aquila in July 20091, China2 and 
Japan3 Statements at the United Nations Climate Summit, 2009). But translating this 
long run target into an international agreement stumbles over the common argument 
that climate policies would harm economic growth, and in particular slow the 
development of emerging and developing countries. 
 
The assessments of climate policies costs provide reassuring messages: the global 
macroeconomic mitigation cost is estimated below five percent of GDP in 2050, even 
for the most stringent emission constraints (IPCC 2007). In addition, a majority of 
economic analyses recommend a uniform carbon tax or a universal cap and trade 
system equalizing marginal abatement costs across countries as the most efficient 
policy (for instance Manne and Richels, 1997 or Weyant and Hill, 1999). 
 
                                                 
1
 ”We recognise the broad scientific view that the increase in global average temperature above pre-
industrial levels ought not to exceed 2°C. Because this global challenge can only be met by a global 
response, we reiterate our willingness to share with all countries the goal of achieving at least a 50% 
reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognising that this implies that global emissions need to peak 
as soon as possible and decline thereafter. As part of this, we also support a goal of developed countries 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in aggregate by 80% or more by 2050 compared to 1990 or 
more recent years” 
2
 ”We will endeavor to cut carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by a notable margin by 2020 from 
the 2005 level [...] We will endeavor to increase the share of non fossil fuels in primary energy 
consulmption to around 15% by 2020”. (Jintao, 2009) 
3
 ”For its mid-term goal, Japan will aim to reduce its emissions by 25% by 2020, if compared to the 
1900 level, consistent with what the science calls for in order to halt global warming”.( Hatoyama, 
2009) 
However these results are submitted to the critical caveat that most models used to 
analyze the climate change economics issues represent a first best world (optimizing 
agents with perfect foresight, market-clearing equilibrium in all markets, full 
utilisation of production factors) , as specified in Box SPM-3 of last IPCC assessment 
report: ‘Most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and with 
universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and 
thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st century’. Such 
assumptions can be suspected of underestimating mitigation costs, making modelling 
results ‘too good to be true’ as Stavins et al (2007) argue in an examination of three 
economic assessments of California climate change policy. Moreover, any deviation 
from the assumed optimal equilibrium to accommodate environmental policies will by 
definition lead to costs in models representing a first best world (Barker et al, 2002). 
Therefore, these methodological choices exclude by construction the possibility of 
synergies between environmental policies and development policies, and thus prevent 
from analyzing this issue. Nevertheless, real economies are characterised by numerous 
imperfections contrasting with the first best representation in most environment-
energy-economy (E3) models. These imperfections can lead to higher mitigation costs 
than estimated as Guivarch et al. (2009) showed in the case of labour markets 
rigidities. But they can also provide opportunities for synergies between climate 
change mitigation and economic growth. 
 
The aim of this article is to analyze the potential for synergies between climate 
policies and development in a case study on India focusing on the power sector sub-
optimalities. To do so, we use IMACLIM-R a dynamic recursive energy-economy model 
that represents a second best world with market imperfections and short-run 
adjustments constraints along a long-term growth path. The first section describes this 
modelling framework, and details how the Indian power sector sub-optimalities are 
represented in this framework. The second section analyses the macroeconomic 
impacts for India of international climate policies, in the form of a worldwide 
coordinated carbon tax or through a global cap-and-trade system. We disentangle the 
mechanisms explaining why global carbon pricing induces prohibitive macroeconomic 
costs for the Indian economy, even in the case of significant financial transfers 
associated with a “Contraction and Convergence in 2100” allocation scheme. The third 
section analyses a ‘package of domestic policies and measures’ implemented in India 
jointly with the participation to the global cap-and-trade system, and focused on 
combining (i) electricity tariff reforms in the agricultural sector accompanied by 
demand side management measures, and (ii) efficiency of the power sector. We show 
that this package of domestic policies and measures allows reducing significantly both 
the duration and the magnitude of India GDP losses following the introduction of the 
global cap-and-trade system. While, the second and third sections focus on 
disentangling the mechanisms leading to our results, the fourth section examines the 
robustness of results through sensitivity tests. Last section concludes. Conclusions are 
twofold (i) from a methodological point of view, considering second best mechanisms 
and sub-optimalities arising in the real world in a modelling framework opens the 
possibility to study potentials for synergies between mitigation policies and 
development; (ii) from a policy point of view, the most cost efficient climate policies 
are not uniform carbon pricing only. The implementation of domestic policies suited 
to the national context, for instance for India targeting sub-optimalities in the power 
sector, allows reducing significantly the macroeconomic costs induced by international 
mitigation policies.  
 1. A modelling framework to represent a second best world 
 
1.1 Model architecture and major features 
1.1.1. A hybrid recursive framework to account for inertia in technical systems 
and sub-optimalities 
IMACLIM-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the world economy that 
is split into 12 regions and 12 sectors (Sassi et al. 2007).  
 
It is hybrid in two senses. First, it is a hybrid model in the classical sense: its structure 
is designed to combine Bottom-Up information in a Top-Down consistent 
macroeconomic framework. Energy is explicitly represented in both money metric 
values and physical quantities so as to capture the specific role of energy sectors and 
their interaction with the rest of the economy. The existence of explicit physical 
variables allows indeed a rigorous incorporation of sector based information about 
how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic incentives.  
 
Second, it is hybrid in the sense of Solow (2000)4, i.e. it tries and bridges the gap 
between long-run and short-run macroeconomics, as efforts were devoted not only to 
model long-term mechanisms but also focus on transition and suboptimal pathways 
through possible underutilization of production factors. We seek, indeed, to capture 
the transition costs with a modeling architecture that allows for endogenous 
disequilibrium generated by the inertia in adapting to new economic conditions due to 
both imperfect foresight and non flexible characteristics of equipment vintages 
                                                 
4
 Solow (2000): ‘I can easily imagine that there is a « true » macrodynamics, valid at every time scale. 
But it is fearfully complicated [...] At the five-to-ten-year time scale, we have to piece things together as 
best we can, and look for a hybrid model that will do the job.’ 
available at each period (putty-clay technologies). In the short run the main available 
flexibility lies in the rate of utilization of capacities, which may induce excess or 
shortage of production factors, unemployment and unequal profitability of capital 
across sectors. Therefore, the model architecture departs from the picture of a first best 
world. 
 
Technically, the model can be labelled as ‘recursive dynamic’, since it generates an 
energy-economy trajectory by solving successive yearly static equilibria of the 
economy, interlinked by dynamic modules.  
Within the static equilibrium, domestic and international markets for all goods – 
except factors such as capital and labour – are fully cleared by a unique set of relative 
prices that depend on the behaviours of representative agents on the demand and 
supply sides. The calculation of this equilibrium determines the following variables: 
relative prices, wages, employment, quantities of goods and services, value flows. 
Within each yearly static equilibrium, the behaviour of producers is not represented by 
a flexible production function allowing for substitution between factors. These 
substitutions are treated between two equilibria in sector-specific dynamic modules. 
Producers are therefore assumed to operate under short-run constraints of (i) a fixed 
maximal production capacity Capk,i, defined as the maximum level of physical output 
achievable with the equipment built and accumulated previously, and (ii) fixed input-
output coefficients representing that, with the current set of embodied techniques, 
producing one unit of a good i in region k requires fixed physical amounts ICj,i,k of 
intermediate goods j and lk,i of labour. In this context, the only margin of freedom of 
producers is to adjust the utilisation rate Qk,i/Capk,i according to the relative market 
prices of inputs and output, taking into account increasing costs when the production 
capacities utilization rate approaches one5. This represents a different paradigm from 
usual production specifications, since the ‘capital’ factor is not always fully operated. 
The dynamic modules shape the accumulation of capital and its technical content, they 
are driven by economic signals, such as prices or sectoral profitability, that emerge 
from former static equilibriums. They include the modelling of (i) the evolution of 
capital and energy equipment stock described in both vintage and physical units (such 
as number of cars, housing square meter, transportation infrastructure), (ii) of 
technological choices of economic agent described as discrete choices in explicit 
technology portfolios for key sectors such as electricity, transportation and alternative 
liquid fuels, or captured through reduced form of technology rich bottom up models, 
and (iii) of endogenous technical change for energy technologies (with learning 
curves). 
 
1.1.2. A growth engine allowing gaps between potential growth and effective 
growth 
Our model growth engine is composed of: 
(i) exogenous demographic trends. The demographic assumptions are drawn from the 
United Nations World Population Prospects “median variant” scenario (United 
Nations 2005).  
(ii) technical progress that increases labour productivity, as in Solow’s neoclassical 
model of economic growth (Solow, 1956). We use exogenous trends of productivity 
growth, as it is a common practice in the energy-environment modelling community 
(e.g. Edmonds et al., 2004, Paltsev et al., 2005). To build these trends we draw on 
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 Mean generation costs increase when capacity utilisation approaches one due to the existence of static 
decreasing returns due to higher labour costs and because less efficient units are switched on last at the 
aggregate level. By default, following Corrado and Mattey (1997), in our model the increasing factor is 
attached to wages. 
stylized facts from the literature, in particular the convergence assumption (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1992) and two empirical analyses on economic convergence, one 
investigating the past trends by (Maddison 1995), and the other one looking at future 
trends, by (Martins et al. 2005). We retained a “leader”, the US, whose labor 
productivity growth trend lies between 2% today and 1.65% in the long run. The other 
regions labor productivity trends catch up with the leader’s, i.e. their labor 
productivity growth is higher all the more as their absolute labor productivity is far 
from the leader’s level.  
 
These two sets of assumptions on demography and technical change, although 
exogenous, only prescribe potential growth. For India, potential growth decreases 
from 8% to 2.7% over the 2050 time horizon. Effective growth results endogenously 
from the interaction of these driving forces with short-term constraints: (i) available 
capital flows for investments and (ii) rigidities, such as fixed technologies, immobility 
of the installed capital across sectors or rigidities in real wages, which may lead to 
partial utilization of production factors (labor and capital). 
 
1.1.3. Calibration  
Our model is calibrated on 2001 data from GTAP 6 database (Dimaranan et 
McDougall 2002) that provides, for the year 2001, a set of balanced input-output 
tables of the world economy, detailed in 87 regions and 57 sectors. We modified the 
original GTAP-6 dataset (i) to aggregate regions and sectors according to the 
IMACLIM-R mapping (Table 1) (ii) to make it fully compatible with the 2001 IEA 
energy balances6.  
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 This process of building hybrid input-output matrices is very precisely discussed in (Sands, Miller and 
Kim 2005). 
 Regions  Sectors 
USA 
Canada 
Europe 
OECD Pacific (JP, AU, NZ, KR) 
Former Soviet Union 
China  
India 
Brazil 
Middle-East Countries 
Africa 
Rest of Asia 
Rest of Latin America 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Liquid Fuels 
Electricity 
Air 
Water 
Other transports 
Construction 
Agriculture 
Energy-intensive industry 
Composite (services and light 
industry) 
Table 1: Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the IMACLIM-R model 
 
 
In the two following subsections we describe how specific sub-optimalities of the 
Indian power sector can be embarked within the Imaclim-R model. 
 
1.2 Sub-optimalities in the power sector in India 
India is characterized by a restrained access to electricity services for both households 
and productive sectors. In 2007, capacity shortage was estimated to 10 GW (14.8% of 
peak power) and the gap between supply and demand reached 66 TWh (9.6% of total 
demand). Electrification covers only 60% of Indian households. The remaining 40% 
mainly on traditional biomass or on diesel generators for their energy needs. 
Productive sectors are also affected by power cuts, which hinder productivity and 
development, in particular for industry, and force the use of diesel generators as well. 
Power cuts and capacity shortage are caused by structural under-investment in the 
power sector, rooted between market and institutional failures. The opening of the 
sector to independent power producers began in 1991 in order to absorb the shortage 
and to compensate for the constraints on public funding. But it failed to improve 
significantly the situation and the private sector contributes only to 11%, 0.4% and 
12% of total generation, transport and distribution respectively. In 2008, realized 
investments in the power sector equal to 14 billion US$ and 21.5 billion US$ would be 
needed to respond to total demand (i.e. the investment gap is equal to 7.5 billion US$ 
or 35%of estimated needs for investments). During the 10th Plan implementation 
period (2002 – 2007), less than half of the additional power capacity that had been 
programmed, has actually been built. This under-investment is largely due to the high 
risks and low profitability of investments in the power sector. Administered prices do 
not cover production costs: in 2006, the average price of electricity sold covered only 
77% of the average production cost. Official data (Government of India, 2008) 
estimate the total under-recovery of costs to 431 billion rupees in 2008 (i.e. 8.8 US$ 
billion). The same report estimates that the residential tariff covers 56% of the 
generation costs and farmers tariff only 12%, while industries and the commercial 
sector partly compensate by paying respectively 108% and 122% of production costs. 
Official data reports that subsidies to household electricity consumption tripled to 80.8 
billion rupees (US$ 1.7 billion) between 1992-1993 and 1999-2000. Subsidies to 
agriculture electricity consumption more than tripled to 227 billion rupees (4.7 US$ 
billion, 1.1% of Indian GDP) over the same period. In 2000, agriculture electricity 
uses represented one third of electricity sales in volume while the corresponding 
revenues constituted only 4 or 5% of total revenues. 
These subsidies are justified by positive externalities on development, particularly 
regarding access to cheap energy for irrigation in an effort to promote food production 
(Tongia and Banerjee, 1998). Nonetheless, they have significant side effects. First, the 
very low tariffs for farmers induce overconsumption, which increases the magnitude 
of capacity shortage. Dorin and Jullien (2004) estimate that overconsumption of 
electricity in the agricultural sector amounts to 30% of its consumption due to the 
combination of critically low prices and of frequent but unpredictable power cuts that 
create a strong incentive to a continuous use of electric pumps for irrigation. Second, 
low revenues from electricity sales induce maintenance under-financing and 
increasing inefficiencies in transmission and distribution (T&D). Technical and 
commercial T&D losses have increased from around 20% in 1993 to more than 30% 
in 2001 (Thakur et al., 2006)7.  
Moreover, power sector inefficiencies constrain economic activity and economic 
growth: electricity shortages hamper productivity and competitiveness.  
 
It appears that the sub-optimalities of the Indian power sector described above are 
structural characteristics of the Indian energy system. Therefore, they have to be taken 
into account in modelling framework to develop realistic prospective scenarios, as 
advocated almost fifteen years ago by Shukla (1995) and more recently by Urban et al 
(2007) and Van Ruijven et al (2008). Next section describes how stylised 
representations of these sub-optimalities are introduced in our modelling framework. 
 
1.3  Representing market and institutional failures of the power sector in our 
modeling architecture 
 
In the static equilibriums, the electricity price depends on the characteristics of the 
installed power generation capacities (the type of fuel used and the efficiency, 
including T&D losses) and on the utilization rate of these generation capacities: high 
utilization rates induce extra-costs. Between each static equilibrium, the evolution of 
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 The level of T&D losses is in fact uncertain. For instance, the value stated by the Indian Planning 
Commission was 22% in 1998 while the World Bank (1998) pointed out that it could actually be twice 
this official level. Moreover, as there is no metering of the electricity consumption it is difficult to 
distinguish technical from commercial losses. 
power generation capacities is represented as follows: when describing annual 
investment decisions within the electric sector, the model anticipates, ten years 
forward, the potential future demand for electricity, taking into account past trends of 
demand. The module then computes an optimal mix of electric productive capacities 
to face the future demand at the lowest cost given (imperfect) anticipations of future 
fuel prices, including carbon pricing if applicable. The share of each technology in the 
optimal capacity mix results from a classical competition among available 
technologies depending on their mean total life-cycle costs (fixed costs, variable costs, 
investment costs).  In practice, 26 producing technologies are in competition according 
to a non flat load curve. 
Once the optimal mix of productive equipment for year t+10 has been computed, the 
model accounts for the time constraints in the deployment of capacities: the new 
capacity built at year t results from a minimization of the gap between the mix of 
capacity currently installed and the mix of capacity that is expected to be optimal to 
face the demand at year t+10. This minimization is run under the constraint of the 
actual amount of investment allocated to the electric sector. This process of planning 
with imperfect foresight is repeated at every period and anticipations are adapted to 
changes in prices and demand.  
 
Within this modelling framework, specificities of the Indian power sector namely (i) 
power generation capacity shortage, (ii) under-investment, (iii) tariffs not reflecting 
costs and subsidies to electricity consumption for farmers and households and (iv) 
inefficiencies and T&D losses, are embarked. 
(i) Power generation capacity shortage is represented by over utilization of generation 
capacities. In the model, a utilization rate superior to 0.8 means that the capacity is 
overused. In 2008, the utilization rate of electricity production capacities is 0.86, 
which corresponds to 7.5% of capacity shortage (i.e. 7.5% more capacities would be 
needed to reach a utilization rate of 0.8) and is consistent with estimations given in the 
first section. This over utilization of productive capacities entails extra generation 
costs8 and raises the electricity usage cost, which is a stylized representation of 
electricity shortage (power cuts) for the Indian economy. 
(ii) Under-investment in the power sector is represented by a gap between the 
estimated need of investments and realized investments in the power sector. Realized 
investments for all sectors are constrained by sectors profitability and total domestic 
investment plus net capital inflows.  
(iii) Tariffs and subsidies for all commodities, including electricity, are encompassed 
in the sectors cost structure of the Social Accounting Matrix for India from GTAP-6 
database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002) that is used to calibrate our model on the 
year 2001.  
(iv) Power plants characteristics, in particular their efficiencies, as well as 
transmission and distribution losses are calibrated on the sectoral model POLES 
(LEPII-EPE, 2006). In 2001, the calibration date, overall efficiency of power 
generation is equal to 32% and Transmission and Distribution losses are 35%. 
 
In sections 2 and 3, we investigate different Indian climate policies and their impact on 
economy. Within the following scenarios, the tariffs and subsidies structure for all 
commodities, including electricity, is by default kept unchanged through the entire 
time horizon. Moreover, without specific policies, the electricity transmission and 
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 Mean generation costs increase when capacity is overused due to the existence of static decreasing 
returns due to higher labour costs and because less efficient units are switched on last at the aggregate 
level. By default, following Corrado and Mattey (1997), in our model the increasing factor is attached to 
wages. 
distribution losses are assumed to evolve at the same pace as generation capacities 
efficiency improvement.   
 
2. Climate policies and Indian development: a deadlock? 
 
2.1 Experimental protocol 
 
We use the IMACLIM-R model described in the previous section to develop scenarios 
with climate policies starting in 2013 so as to fit a given global emissions profile 
corresponding to stabilisation target at a concentration of 450ppm CO2. This places us 
in a “cost-efficiency” context.  
 
For the setting of climate policies, we test, in this section, the prescriptions 
straightforward in a first best world: to equalize marginal abatement costs across 
countries with uniform carbon pricing so as to minimize the costs of a given 
environmental target. Two polar variants of climate regimes assure uniform carbon 
pricing: either a worldwide coordinated carbon tax or a global cap-and-trade system. 
The allocation of emission quotas in this second setting induces transfers between 
countries, therefore giving a lever on equity issues. In the following, we first consider 
a uniform carbon tax for all regions (Simulation 1); the level of this carbon tax is 
endogenously determined so that global emissions respect the emissions profile target. 
The carbon tax revenues are rebated to households in a lump-sum manner9. In a 
second step, we consider a global cap and trade system (Simulation 2). The quota 
system is represented by the assumption that countries auction emission permits and 
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 It has previously been show that the alternative uses of tax revenues, for instance to reduce other pre-
existing taxes, can change results significantly (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999). It is also the case in 
our model (Guivarch et al, 2009), as we will see in the section 4 “Sensitivity analysis and robustness”. 
return the revenues to households in lump-sum payments. Comparing these two 
simulations will allow us to separate the respective roles of the carbon pricing and of 
the international transfers due to quota allocation. The allocation rule chosen for 
Simulation 2 corresponds to a “Contraction and Convergence” (Meyer, 2000) of per 
capita emission at the 2100 horizon (CC2100), under a contracting global emission 
profile. This rule has been proposed as a bridge between the two polar rules: the 
grandfathering approach and the immediate equalitarian per capita criteria. 
 
 
2.2 Implications of sub-optimalities in the reference scenario and in mitigation 
scenarios 
Before describing and analyzing mitigation scenarios, we give a short description of 
major features of the baseline. An analyze of this reference scenario is detailed in 
Guivarch and Mathy, 2009. 
 
The first major characteristic of the baseline is the fact that sub-optimalities in the 
power sector are long lasting. The power shortage persists due to the constraint on 
investment and the induced over-utilization of installed capacity drives to significant 
extra usage costs of electricity (the extra costs due to over-utilization of power 
generation capacities represent between 1.5% and 15% of production costs in the 
baseline scenario). As a consequence, industries are forced to resort to diesel 
generators to compensate for deficiencies of the centralized power supply. This limits 
the substitution from other energy sources, in particular oil, to electricity and 
constraint industrial production. 
 
The second characteristic is therefore India’s economy dependency on oil, the majority 
of which is imported. The power sector deficiencies and the induced obstacles to 
substitution to electricity reinforce India’s vulnerability to the rise of oil price. As a 
result India is deeply affected by its oil dependency: oil imports reach 10% of GDP in 
2027 when the oil prices rise steeply due to the beginning of the depletion phase of 
reserves. 
 
The interplay between the structural capacity shortage of the power sector and the 
rising profile of oil prices drives to slower economic growth than in other existing 
prospective scenarios (IEA, 2007; Shukla 2006; EIA, 2007). In particular, economic 
growth declines significantly during the steep rise in oil price from 5.7% GDP growth 
rate in 2019 to 3.8% in 2027. GDP growth constrains energy efficiency improvement 
through the (limited) capacity to finance carbon sober technologies for productive 
capital or final equipment, and through the pace of capital vintages replacement: the 
lower the GDP growth, the lower the investment in new capital, the older is the 
average capital age, the worse its average energy efficiency. Therefore with important 
constraints on investments in the power sector, energy efficiency improvements are 
mechanically also constrained. As a result, energy decoupling of GDP and economic 
growth are much slower than in other existing scenarios (IEA 2006, 2007). 
 
In mitigation scenarios, the electricity price increase and the overall activity decrease 
due to the macroeconomic impact of carbon pricing induces lower electricity demand 
significant enough to absorb the capacity shortage as soon as 2017 in Simulation 1 and 
2020 in Simulation 2. But the pace of energy efficiency improvement in the power 
sector remains constrained by an even slower pace of capital vintage replacement. 
Moreover, subsidies mask incentives for end-use efficiency and maintain over-
consumption habits. Given these implications of the power sector sub-optimalities in 
mitigation scenarios, we further investigate the macroeconomic impacts of mitigation 
policies in Simulations 1 and 2.  
 
2.3 A universal carbon tax: prohibitive costs for India 
The stabilisation objective leads to a world carbon price quasi-linear from 2013 to 
2040, when it reaches 80US$(2001)/tCO2, and slightly decreasing to 
65US$(2001)/tCO2 in 2050. These values are within the range depicted by existing 
modelling studies analysing stabilization around 450ppmCO2: 30 to 155 US$/tCO2 in 
2050 (IPCC, 2007).  
 
This carbon tax induces prohibitive macroeconomic costs for India (Figure 1): Indian 
GDP losses reach almost 20% of baseline GDP in 2030. These GDP losses are 
composed of (i) final consumption losses, (ii) trade losses (fewer exports and more 
imports) and (iii) less investment. Next paragraphs explore the mechanisms at stake in 
the evolution of the three components. 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of GDP variation between final consumption losses, decrease in 
investments and trade losses between Simulation 1 (uniform carbon tax) and the 
reference scenario. 
 
First, final consumption losses come from the combination of (i) an increased energy 
budget for households, which crowds-out other goods consumption; and (ii) an income 
effect: the carbon tax rebated to households does not compensate the revenue losses 
due to less activity and lower real wages level10. Figure 2 gives the evolution of 
households budget share for non-energy goods consumption in the presence of the 
carbon tax compared to the reference scenario. It is reduced the first ten years after the 
introduction of the tax, but increases afterwards as technical change and consumption 
behaviour change away from carbon intensive goods are induced by carbon pricing. 
Households real income11 losses roughly follow the same profile as GDP losses profile 
and peak at -18% in 2030. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of household budget share for non energy goods consumption in 
Simulation 1 (uniform carbon tax) compared to the reference scenario. 
 
Second, trade losses are due to competitiveness losses of Indian products following the 
introduction of carbon pricing. The competitiveness loss can be measured by the 
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 This latter effect comes from the representation of the labour markets through aggregate regional 
wage curves that link real wages to unemployment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). See 
Guivarch et al (2009) for a detailed analysis of the implications of such a representation of labour 
markets imperfections on stabilisation costs.  
11
 Households real income is their total revenue related to the final consumption price index. 
evolution of the ratio of the selling price on international markets to the local 
production cost (Table 2). Throughout the simulation period, the competitiveness 
index remains about 5% inferior in simulation 1 than in the reference scenario. This 
competitiveness loss is due to higher energy share in industrial production costs in 
India than in other regions of the world. These effects are reinforced by persisting sub-
optimalities in the power sector and thus the high electricity usage costs for industry. 
Therefore production costs are relatively more affected by carbon pricing than in other 
regions. 
 
And third, the investment term showed in Figure 1 follows the general economic 
activity, and is therefore reduced compared to the reference scenario. 
 
Table 2: Evolution of the competitiveness index and of the electricity price in Simulation 
1 (uniform carbon tax) compared to the reference scenario (reference scenario index=1). 
 2020 2030 2050 
Competitiveness index 0.96 0.95 0.96 
Electricity price 1.29 1.41 1.17 
 
 
If GDP losses reach dramatic levels around 2030, we may nonetheless note that Indian 
GDP losses are ‘transition losses’ over the period 2013-2050: they increase in the first 
part of the period and decrease in the second part. This latter decrease is due to (i) 
carbon tax induced technical change that lowers abatement costs and energy shares in 
production costs; but also to (ii) less vulnerability of the Indian economy to oil price 
rise at the end of the modelling period.  
 
The first element is illustrated in Table 22, which shows the evolution of the energy 
share in Indian industrial production costs over the 2012-2050 period in Simulation 1 
compared to the reference scenario. It reveals that, at the end of the period, technical 
change induced by the global carbon tax leads to a lower energy share than in the 
reference case. 
 
As for the second element, Guivarch et al. (2009) and Guivarch and Mathy (2009) 
showed that, in IMACLIM-R simulations, in the absence of specific policies such as 
subsidises to oil consumption or capital inflows, India is very vulnerable to a rise of 
international oil prices. This vulnerability is explained by mechanisms similar to those 
described above in the case of a carbon tax (loss of competitiveness due to high energy 
share in industrial production costs, crowding-out of other goods consumption by the 
energy burden, wage effect), aggravated by the transfer of income to oil exporting 
countries implied by higher oil prices. This vulnerability is reduced by climate policies 
for two reasons (Table 3). First, international oil prices are lowered by less global 
demand: compared to the baseline, oil prices are almost 30% lower in 2030 and 12% 
in 2050. Secondly, technical change and consumption structure change induced by 
climate policies reduce Indian dependence on imported. Table 3 shows indeed that 
Indian oil imports are 40% lower in value in 2030 and 20% lower in 2050 with climate 
policies compared to the reference scenario. This reduction of vulnerability to oil price 
rise can be explained by a better anticipation of oil tensions, thanks to earlier and more 
regular increases in final energy price. In a second-best world where anticipations are 
imperfect, indeed, brutal and unexpected increases in energy prices cause larger 
macroeconomic losses than regular and planned increases. Here, the more regular 
increase in energy price with climate policies prevents economic lock-in in an oil-
dependent scheme and promotes the development of oil-free technologies before the 
beginning of the depletion phase in oil production. 
 
Table 3: Variations, between Simulation 1 and the reference scenario, of the value of oil 
imports and decomposition of this variation between a price effect and a volume effect 
(second and third line) 
 2020 2030 2050 
Oil imports (value) -31% -39% -17% 
World oil price -20% -28% -11% 
Oil imports 
(volume) 
-13% -15% -7% 
 
This uniform carbon tax scenario reveals very significant economic impacts for India. 
The following sub-section analyses whether the financial transfers induced by a cap-
and-trade system are able to reduce the costs of carbon pricing to an acceptable level 
for India. 
 
2.4 Quota allocations to solve equity issues? 
The second simulation considers a global cap-and-trade scheme with a ‘Contraction 
and Convergence’ (at the 2100 horizon) quotas allocation rule. With this allocation 
rule, India receives quotas equal to its emissions when the global cap-and-trade system 
is implemented; its per capita allocation increases to 0.4 tC/cap in 2030 and decreases 
afterwards. Table 4 shows that the allocation rule becomes stringent before 2020. The 
carbon price resulting from the implementation of the global cap-and-trade system 
induces effective emissions significantly lower than the allocation India receives with 
the contraction and convergence rule. 
  
Table 4: Emission quotas allocated to India compared to the reference scenario emissions 
and effective emissions in Simulation 2 (in tons of carbon per capita). 
 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference scenario 0.31 0.40 0.52 0.62 0.76 
Contraction and Convergence 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.32 
Effective emissions 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24 
 
 
The carbon price emerging from this climate policy design is very close to that of the 
scenario with a global carbon tax. Financial transfers linked to quotas exchanges take 
place: India is a quota seller throughout the whole time horizon and receives up to 
2.6% of its GDP from these sells (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Financial transfers received by India as a percentage of its GDP, compared to 
transfers received by other quotas sellers and paid by quota buyers as a percentage of 
their respective GDP. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
India 1.5% 2.6% 2.3% 0.6% 
Other quota sellers 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 0.4% 
Quota buyers 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 
Note: 1. The group of quota selling countries evolves with time. India, China, Brazil, Africa are quota 
sellers during the whole period; USA, Canada, Europe, OECD Pacific, FSU and Middle East are quota 
buyers during the whole period; Rest of Asia and Rest of Latin America are alternatively quotas sellers 
and quota buyers. 
2. Figures related to quota buyers are inferior to figures related to quota sellers because of the difference 
in GDP levels between the two groups of countries. 
 
In spite of the very significant transfers received12, India economy is still heavily 
affected the first fifteen years of the climate policies, with GDP losses reaching 6% of 
the reference scenario GDP in 2019 (Figure 3). 
                                                 
12
 To put these financial flows into perspective, Official Development Assistance (ODA) currently 
received by India represents about 0.3% of its GDP, and donor countries devote between 0.3 and 0.4% 
of their GDP to ODA. 
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Figure 3 : Decomposition of GDP variation between final consumption losses, decrease in 
investments and trade losses between Simulation 2 (global cap-and-trade CC2100) and 
the reference scenario. 
 
Two main elements due to capital inflows linked to quotas selling explain the 
differences from the scenario with a global carbon tax: (i) the income effect of quotas 
revenues, and (ii) the trade balance and real exchange rates effect due to quotas 
exchanges. On the one hand the revenues from quotas partially offset the revenue 
losses due to less activity and lower real wages level in the years following the 
introduction of carbon pricing, and contribute to the increase of final consumption. On 
the other hand, the capital inflow from quotas selling causes an appreciation of real 
exchange rates, which penalizes Indian products for exports and favours imported 
goods on domestic markets. This appreciation of real exchange rates corresponds to 
one of the symptoms of the so-called "natural resource curse" or ‘Dutch Disease’, 
which have been observed in most oil-producing countries (Sachs and Warner, 2001), 
and has previously been highlighted in the case of capital flows due GHG quotas 
exchanges by McKibbin et al. (2000). 
 
The resulting time profile of GDP variation (Figure 3) shows that financial transfers 
due to quotas selling do not offset the negative macroeconomic effect of 
competitiveness losses and crowding out of non energy goods consumption, during a 
transition period. After 2030, however, the positive macroeconomic effect of financial 
inflows dominates and Indian GDP becomes higher than in the reference scenario. 
 
The transition macroeconomic losses happen when the carbon price is still low and 
when allocations are still close from the grandfathering allocation rule. One solution 
could be to define another allocation rule generating more financial transfers towards 
India in the early years of implementation of the cap-and-trade scheme. Nevertheless, 
high transfers face a credibility gap13 and that have little chance to be acceptable for 
Annex I countries (Jacoby et al., 2008). Moreover, this solution would not solve the 
issue of real exchange rate appreciation due to large amount of financial inflows in 
India. 
 
In the following we propose an alternative scenario based on Indian domestic policies 
targeting sub-optimalities in the power sector. 
 
3. Looking for synergies between climate policies and development 
3.1 Further simulations 
This part explores a ‘package of domestic policies and measures’ implemented in 
India jointly with the participation to the global cap and trade system. The domestic 
policies we consider are meant to reduce transition economic losses due to the 
international mitigation policy and to create synergies between mitigation policies and 
development policies in India. As it was highlighted that sub-optimalities in the power 
sector hinder both growth and energy efficiency (Guivarch and Mathy, 2009), the 
                                                 
13
 One should not forget that donor countries committed themselves to dedicate 0.7% of their GDP to 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), but do not respect this commitment, only dedicating 0.4% of 
their GDP dedicated to ODA. 
policies considered are specifically targeting these sub-optimalities. In the following 
simulation (Simulation 3), the focus is on combining (i) electricity tariff reforms in the 
agricultural sector accompanied by demand side management measures, and (ii) 
efficiency of the power sector. Indeed, literature on energy issues in India shows the 
need for a tariff reform so that prices better reflect costs (Filippini and Pachauri, 
2004). In addition to giving energy savings incentive, it would increase revenues for 
the power sector. However, to overcome strong social and political obstacles to a tariff 
reform, it appears, as pointed out by Bose et al. (2006)14, that it has to be combined 
with an ambitious program improving the power supply quality.  
 
In practice, the alternative scenario we consider still follows global emissions profile 
corresponding to stabilisation target at a concentration of 450ppm CO2, and assumes a 
global cap and trade system starting in 2013 with quota allocations based on the 
CC2100 rule, as in the preceding section. The ‘package of domestic policies and 
measures’ is assumed to start also in 2013 and encompasses: 
The progressive reduction of subsidies to electricity consumption for the agricultural 
sector, accompanied by demand side management (improvement of irrigation pumps, 
evolution of consumption habits15). Following the reform suggested by the World 
Bank (2001), it is assumed that on the one hand, the subsidies decrease and the unit 
price increases, but on the other hand, the consumption level decreases. This joint 
evolution is supposed to occur at a constant budget for electricity for farmers and to 
reach a cut of 50% of the subsidies to electricity consumption for the agricultural 
sector, over a 10 year period. 
                                                 
14
 Bose et al. (2006) evaluate for different consumer categories their willingness to pay more for a better 
supply quality (with less shortage) in the Karnataka region. 
15
 In particular, if the grid quality and the service are improved, the number of unpredictable power cuts 
will be significantly lower, and farmers will not have to leave their pumps switched on all day long. 
- The implementation of a program to reduce electricity T&D technical and 
commercial losses. This program would partly be composed of refurbishment of 
obsolete installations of power distribution all around the country but also of new 
managerial methods to reduce commercial losses (details of such a program can be 
found in IEA, 2002). The cost and the potential for improvement are calibrated on 
Ruet (2001). The level of T&D losses decreases to 15% over a 20 year period. 
- The revenues following the partial removal of electricity consumption subsidies in 
the agricultural sectors are used to finance the demand side management program in 
the agricultural sector, the reduction of technical and commercial losses in electricity 
T&D, and the additional power generation capacities if needed. Remaining additional 
revenues, if any, are rebated to households through lump-sum transfers. 
 
3.2 Results 
Figure 4 focuses on the transition and shows the Indian GDP variation between 
Simulation 3 and the reference scenario for the first two decades after policies 
introduction. 
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Figure 4 : Decomposition of GDP variation between final consumption losses, decrease in 
investments and trade losses between Simulation 3 (global cap-and-trade CC2100 with 
package of domestic policies in India) and the reference scenario. 
 
In this simulation, Indian GDP losses are confined to the first three years after the start 
of mitigation policies and peak GDP losses are limited to 2% of the reference scenario 
GDP. These lower macroeconomic costs of the international mitigation policy than in 
Simulation 2 are brought by the package of domestic policies and measures via three 
main channels.  
First, the reduction of electricity T&D losses decreases the electricity usage cost by 
4% in 2015, 5% in 2020 and 8% in 2030 in Simulation 3 compared to Simulation 2. 
This cost decrease induces substitution from fossil fuels to electricity in the industry 
section, which leads to a lower share of energy budget in industrial production costs. 
Therefore Indian products lose relatively less competitiveness in this simulation than 
in Simulation 2, and salaries are less squeezed to restore commercial balance: wage 
levels are 3% higher than in Simulation 2 in 2015, and 9% in 2020 and 2030. 
Second, the same decrease of electricity usage cost reduces households energy budget 
share, which leads to less crowding-out of other goods consumption. However, this 
effect is non monotonous as it derives from complex interactions between energy 
prices, revenues dynamics and equipment dynamics (personal vehicles ownership for 
instance): between Simulations 2 and 3, households energy budget shares are reduced 
by 0.7 percentage point in 2015, 0.4 in 2020 and 0.5 in 2030. 
Third, there is a positive income effect stemming from higher wage levels, more 
wages volume due to more overall activity and transfers to households coming from 
the remaining revenue generated by subsidies decrease not used to finance the 
domestic policies and measures (which represent up to 0.4% of GDP in the 
Simulation).  
 
These results show that the package of domestic policies and measures considered in 
this scenario reduces significantly the magnitude and duration of transition 
macroeconomic losses due to international mitigation policies. While last sections 
aimed at disentangling the cost formation mechanisms under alternative policy 
settings, next section will test the robustness of the results through a sensitivity 
analysis to the model parameterization. 
 
 
4. Sensitivity analysis and robustness 
In this antepenultimate section we reproduce the same policies setting as in Simulation 
1, 2 and 3 with alternative parameterization of the model to take into account the 
uncertainties on a large set of exogenous parameters. The uncertain parameters include 
inter alia: the amount of fossil fuel reserves, the coal market responsiveness to demand 
increase, the rhythm of technical change (date of availability of low carbon 
technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration, rate of learning by doing, etc.), 
the synfuels supply curve characteristics and its evolution, the future development 
styles (rate of car ownership increase when revenue increase for instance).  A detailed 
description of these parameters and the method used to conduct a sensitivity analysis 
is given in Vogt-Schilb et al. (2009). Climate policies international architecture is 
either a uniform carbon tax (as in Simulation 1) or a global cap-and-trade scheme with 
emission quotas allocated following the CC2100 rule (as in Simulation 2). Domestic 
policies are either uniform carbon pricing alone (as in Simulation 1 and 2) or in 
parallel with the package of domestic policies and measures focussing on electricity 
tariff reform for the agriculture sector and on efficiency in the power sector (as in 
Simulation 3). Moreover, we test alternative uses of carbon pricing revenues: they are 
either rebated to households in a lump-sum manner or used to reduce other taxes. 
 
Figure 5 confirms that a global carbon tax implies prohibitive costs for India: the mean 
peak GDP loss is 10.8% of reference GDP, with results ranging between 4.7% and 
24.3%. We may note this result varies significantly with the use of carbon pricing 
revenues: the mean peak GDP loss is 15.7% of reference GDP when carbon revenues 
are rebated to households and 8.1% when they are used to reduce other taxes. 
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Figure 5 : Range of Indian GDP variation when a global uniform carbon tax is 
introduced (% of corresponding reference GDP). The shaded area gives the full range of 
variation for the alternative parameterization of the model tested, the plain line gives the 
mean across scenarios where the carbon tax revenues are rebated to households and the 
dashed line gives the mean across scenarios when they are used to reduce other taxes. 
 
Figure 6 (left panel) shows that a global cap and trade system with CC2100 quota 
allocation rule does not solve the transition cost issue. Indeed, the mean duration of 
GDP losses is 9 years, with results ranging from 5 to 21 years, and the magnitude of 
peak GDP loss ranges from 2.3% of reference GDP to 10.9%, with a mean value equal 
to 4.8%. In this policy setting again the use of carbon pricing revenues influences 
significantly the results: the duration of GDP loss is reduced on average by 4 years 
when revenues are used to reduce other taxes compared to the cases when they are 
rebated to households in a lump-sum manner. 
Figure 6 (right panel) shows the robustness, in alternative future worlds, of the 
package of domestic policies and measures considered in this study to reduce the 
transition macroeconomic losses for India following the introduction of a global cap-
and-trade scheme. The duration of macroeconomic losses is limited to 5 years on 
average, extremes being 0 years and 15 years. The magnitude of the peak GDP loss is 
reduced by 3.7 percentage point on average.  
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Figure 6 : Range of Indian GDP variation when a global cap-and-trade scheme is 
introduced (% of corresponding reference GDP). The left panel gives the range for 
scenarios where domestic policies are uniform carbon pricing alone (as in Simulation 2), 
while the right panel gives the range for scenarios including the package of domestic 
policies and measures focussing on electricity tariff reform for the agriculture sector and 
on efficiency in the power sector (as in Simulation 3).The shaded area gives the full range 
of variation for the alternative parameterization of the model tested, the plain line gives 
the mean across scenarios where the carbon tax revenues are rebated to households and 
the dashed line gives the mean across scenarios when they are used to reduce other taxes. 
 
Figure 7 shows histograms and smoothed densities of peak GDP losses (in % of 
reference scenario GDP) with and without the package of domestic policies and 
measures considered in this article. With the package of domestic policies and 
measures the histogram is shifted to the left, indicating that these domestic policies 
reduce the macroeconomic transition losses for India following the introduction of a 
global cap-and-trade scheme. Moreover the right tail of the peak GDP loss distribution 
is shortened: the domestic policies avoid cases with very large GDP losses. 
 
 Figure 7 : Histogram and smoothed densities of Indian peak GDP losses (in %) due to 
mitigation policies. Grey bars and dashed line corresponds to scenarios where domestic 
policies are uniform carbon pricing alone, while black bars and plain line corresponds to 
scenarios including the package of domestic policies and measures focussing on 
electricity tariff reform for the agriculture sector and on efficiency in the power sector.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, we may first summarize the findings of the modelling exercises explored 
in this article. First, it appears that global carbon pricing induces prohibitive 
macroeconomic costs for the Indian economy, even in the case of significant financial 
transfers associated with a “Contraction and Convergence in 2100” allocation scheme. 
Second, we identified a ‘package of domestic policies and measures’ focussing on 
combining (i) electricity tariff reforms in the agricultural sector accompanied by 
demand side management measures, and (ii) efficiency of the power sector. We 
showed that this package of domestic policies and measures allows reducing 
significantly both the duration and the magnitude of India GDP losses following the 
introduction of the global cap-and-trade system. This analyse confirms, in the case of 
India that policies focusing on the current sub-optimalities of the power sector appear 
as a centre piece of domestic development policies in the context of global mitigation 
policies. 
 
We acknowledge that this study is limited because of the focus on the power sector 
only.  Conclusions regarding the potential for implementing synergies between 
development and mitigation could be reinforced by considering a larger panel of 
sectors. Further research is needed to broaden the scope of sectors and types of 
domestic policies and measures considered. Moreover, the time sequence of policies 
and entry into a global agreement should be analysed. 
 
Nethertheless, two strong messages can be drawn from our results. First, from a 
methodological point of view, our approach calls for the representation of second-best 
mechanisms and of national specificities in modelling frameworks used to assess 
climate policies. Second, from a policy point of view, our results open room for 
synergies between mitigation policies and development. At the core of these synergies, 
appears the crucial role of domestic policies and measures focusing on removing 
energy consumption subsidies and enhancing energy efficiency, and adapted to 
national specificities. This result suggest rephrasing the issue for international climate 
policies from the question of the fairness of burden sharing to the design of an 
architecture in which climate policies could contribute to development over the long 
run but also here and now.  
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